Thai Military in Politics: Return to The Barracks?

[Fidel]

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Some of you might find this interesting.

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Thai Military in Politics: Return to The Barracks?

By Busakorn Suriyasarn (September, 1993)

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Introduction

When the Thai military, led by Suchinda Kraprayoon, overthrew Chatichai's government in early 1991, it was a surprise to most political observers of Thailand. During a decade-long parliamentary democracy since Prem's administration in the 1980s, military coups were no longer thought to be a means of power transition in the country like Thailand where the economy was robust.

 

Moreover, as with other coups in the past, there was no large-scale protest. Except for some academicians and politicians, it seemed to be acceptable for the general public, if not welcomed.

 

How can one explain this unexpected (though not unusual) 1991 coup in Thailand? What can be demonstrated as the factors of the persistence of Thai military intervention in politics. A number of political scientists suggest a positive correlation between high levels of socio-economic development and the degree to which the military are disposed to leave politics. (1)

 

Was this factor of socio-economic sufficient to explain military intervention in the case of Thailand? In order to answer these questions, one needs to look at the Thai military past role in politics as well as a number of other factors that influence its persistent intervention.

 

 

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A Brief History of Thai Military Role in Politics

Since the 1932 revolution, by which Thailand was brought under a constitutional monarchy, Thailand has mostly been governed by a series of military rule. While democracy was by and large a foreign concept to most of (then) Siamese populations, the military which had gained its maturity by the first half of the twentieth century quickly assumed ruling power. (2)

 

Pridi Banomyong, a serious democracy advocate and a revolutionary leader, was forced twice into exile because of his progressive ideas proven incompatible with those of the ruling military elites. (3)

 

After a short period of Phahon's military-dominated government (1933-1938), the military dictators such as Phibun, Sarit, Thanom and Praphat dominated politics from 1938 until the student uprising in 1973. Unlike their predecessors, Phahon who attempted--albeit unsuccessfully--to implement the democratic aim of the 1932 revolution in cooperation with Pridi, these military rulers led increasingly to the authoritarian rule.

 

Besides renaming the country--from Siam to Thailand--Phibun also readjusted the relationship between the state and the citizenry. He elevated the government to the paramount position. In his ideology, the people were to be grateful and obey the phunum--the guardian of the nation. (4)

 

In the 1950s, while Phibun was still in power, Sarit emerged as the real power figure. With a strong royal and popular support, he overthrew Phibun regime in 1957, justified by Phibun's economic failure and his alleged links with the coercive police.

 

After Sarit died in 1963, Thanom and Praphat did not enjoy much support from the palace the role of which was elevated greatly by Sarit from its suppression during Phibun regime. As a consequence, when the students revolted in 1973 due to their suppressive and oligarchic rule, the two military dictators--Thanom and Praphat--were forced to leave the country, largely influenced by the monarch, King Bhumipol.

 

 

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How Did the Military Justify Its Role?

 

In Thailand, where the major pillars are nation, religion (Buddhism) and monarchy [Thai: chart, sassana, pramahakasat], the military asserts itself as "the protector of the nation." The common justification used by one military regime after another has been "national security." As in most developing countries, better established and better disciplined, Thai military sees itself as a competent and strong leadership--in both protecting and governing the country.

 

When the military developed a high level of professionalism and efficiency in the 1950s, considerably enabled by the U.S. aid (5), the Army under Sarit assumed the role of "the protector of the nation" which seemingly had limitless boundary. Entering the modern era, the military role expanded outside conventional military affairs.

 

In his regime, Sarit initiated the phattana (national development) policy. Emphasizing economic and educational development, the first national economic plan--covering a six-year period--was launched and continued until 1973. New agencies were created such as Ministry of National Development, National Economic Development Board, National Research Council, etc. (6)

 

Even though the military role in national development has already been initiated since Sarit regime, it was not materialized until the late 1970s, when there appeared to be a shift in attitudes of some military leaders. Foreseeing the difficulties of using coups as the only means to seize power, they developed a new strategy in playing politics, i.e., moving toward rural development, which enabled them to build the contacts at the grassroots level.

 

In the 1970s, when communist expansion became threatening, national security was a legitimate justification for the military to counter communist insurgencies in various rural areas. Since 1978, several mass organizations were developed by the military as a counter-insurgency measure, such as the National Defense Volunteers, the Volunteer Development and Self-Defense Villages and the Organization of Military Reservists for National Security.

 

These organizations were established under the control of the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) of which the de facto director was the Army Chief. (7) Under this policy the army had a vast authority over other government agencies involved in national security. Moreover, legitimized by the Prime Minister Order No. 66/2323 (1980), the military involvements draw no line between national security policies, government services and military affairs. (8)

 

Besides using national security and national development as justifications, the military also cites the lack of legitimacy of civilian governments whenever it chooses to intervene in politics. Characterized by corruptions and personal rivalries, Thai civilian governments have been generally short-lived and vulnerable to military interruption as evident in the 1991 coup.

 

 

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The Military Decline: Return to the Barracks?

 

Up to this point, it is obvious that the military has played a dominant role in Thai politics. However, it is by no means invulnerable to change. Since Prem's administration, the military has been weakened politically. Although it can be ratified by the military's own problem of factionalism, it is also a result of the increased strength of the Thai parliament. (9) Elections have been held regularly.

 

In addition, while economic goal is the nation's top priority, the military faces more constraints in expanding its role. Due to the higher level of education and modernization, coupled with the economy-oriented international environment, the government as well as the military are more pressured to respond to the popular demands.

 

Even after the junta took over in 1991, the civilian-dominated interim government, led by Anand Panyarachun, gave less than it wanted--at least not the increase in the defense budget. Following the May 1992 pro-democracy protest, the military's political power has been greatly curbed. The latest constitution requires the Prime Minister to be an elected MP.

 

The Constitution also reduces significantly the power of the military-dominated Senate. Barred from taking part in no-confidence motions, the military lost its traditional tool to threaten elected coalitions. (10) Furthermore, the Internal Peacekeeping Act which came into law after October 1976 coup was abolished, giving the Supreme Commander no more right to use force to put down unrest. (11)

 

In conclusion, it may be fair to say that in the case of Thailand, socio-economic progress has had an impact on the military's decreased role in politics in the past decade. Several factors such as the military's historical involvements in politics, its attitudes toward civilian governments and democracy, as well as the Thai political culture are to be taken into account in examining its persistent intervention. Furthermore, the monarch--whose role as the political mediator has been indispenable during the last several decades--cannot be left out of the Thai political equation.

 

At this point, it is quite certain that the military has acknowledged its shrunken channel to political power. Nevertheless, whether it will withdraw completely from politics and adopt Western-style professionalism remains a question. My observation is that the military leaders will opt for the rules, considering that more ex-generals have established their own political parties to enter politics through the proper channel, i.e., elections.

 

Most of all, as long as the level of political consciousness of the populace and the integrity of the civilian politicians are left to be desired, Thai politics remains a floor for intervention by the military--which may be waiting cautiously for another right moment. The Thai military will not return to its barracks completely unless genuine participatory democracy is achieved in Thailand.

 

[pattaya127]

Not sure why you print a 10 year old article, however interesting that is about the "culture" of coup D'Etat in thailand. Anyway, politics can't be discussed as a rule, so i have to close it.

Cordially