Does Thailand's Military Answer to the Government?

[Mentors]

After anti-government protesters invaded the country's parliament and stripped military police of their weapons, Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva declared a state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding provinces on Wednesday. By invoking emergency rule, however, Abhisit has staked his premiership and his political future on cooperation from what may be the most powerful and unpredictable player in Thailand's politics  the military.

 

Will the military cooperate with the prime minister? Just as rapidly as the state of emergency was imposed, rumors began circulating concerning the loyalties of the commanders. Because in Thailand, unlike most developed democracies, the military doesn't always answer to the government.

 

"The army is like a racehorse and governments are merely jockeys who come and go," Privy Councilor, former Army Chief and Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda said during a speech to cadets in July 2006. "The [military's]owners are the nation and the King." Under Thailand's constitution, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, a constitutional monarch, is the commander in chief, although he does not appear to involve himself directly in military affairs. Two months after Prem's speech, the army ousted elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in a bloodless coup. Over the last several weeks, the protesters on the streets of Bangkok demanding Abhisit dissolve parliament and call new elections have been, by and large, Thaksin supporters. Known as the Red Shirts for the color they wear, they want him back.

 

While the coup against Thaksin came as a surprise because there hadn't been one in 14 years, military ousters have been commonplace throughout modern Thai history. The military has staged 18 successful coups since 1932, when a group of army officers and intellectuals overthrew the last absolute monarch. After that, the military has ruled overtly for much of the time, or influenced politics from behind the scenes. In May 1992, Bangkok's middle class rose up against a general who usurped power following an election in which he was not a candidate. Soldiers responded with deadly force. King Bhumibol intervened to end bloodshed and restore democracy, and many had believed the days of coups in Thailand had passed as the army appeared to gradually retreat from any overt political role.

 

Soldiers, however, were still meddling in politics. According to poll monitors, some officers have interfered in just about every election since that time. Military personnel are part of the patronage networks of leading politicians, whose influence they rely upon to advance their careers in the armed forces if they hold power. This provides incentives for soldiers to try and influence political outcomes. The most blatant example of such patronage was when Thaksin appointed his cousin Army Chief in 2003. That move sparked a backlash among soldiers who were not part of Thaksin's patronage network. They feared the army would become the political tool of the prime minister, who was known for his inability to tolerate dissent. In 2006, the top generals believed Thaksin was planning to remove them for refusing his orders to crack down on protesters, and so moved against him while he was attending a United Nations meeting in New York. In one of the many ironies in Thai politics, they installed a former Army Chief and Privy Councilor, Gen. Surayud Chulanont as prime minister. As Army Chief, Surayud had opposed soldiers meddling in politics.

 

The Thai army sees itself as an honest and selfless force to develop the nation, and a moral counterpoint to corrupt politicians, according to Chris Baker, co-author of A History of Thailand. This conveniently ignores a long history of corruption within the military and abuse of citizen's rights. But unlike Western democracies where power is divided between executive, legislative and judicial branches, Thailand has long relied on a balance of power between several institutions including the legislature, the bureaucracy, the monarchy and the military. While Thailand's governments have promoted modern democracy, and most Thai citizens have now come to expect it, attempts to radically upset this balance  as Thaksin did by appointing his loyalists to key commands  risk sparking the kind of reaction that resulted in the 2006 coup against him.

 

Armed with this view, the military seemingly does not regard itself as beholden to the nation's elected leaders. The army has rejected orders from four different prime ministers to quash demonstrations against their rule  at the start of the Asian economic crisis in 1997, during street protests against Thaksin in 2006, in 2008 when protesters occupied the prime minister's office, and, most notoriously, at Bangkok's international airports in order to force Thaksin-allied prime ministers from office. Some believe the army refused to act because it did not want blood on its hands to save politicians, reviving the black stain on its reputation from May 1992 when dozens were killed. Others believe the army's inaction was to advance its own political interests at the time.

 

And following Thaksin's ouster, the army has clearly become more involved in politics, despite ceding overt power to elected politicians after little more than one year. It played a key role in Abhisit's rise to the premiership, helping to broker deals between politicians who had been loyal to Thaksin so they would join Abhisit's coalition. The generals also used their troops to break up Red Shirt riots last April in Bangkok aimed at ousting Abhisit. Among the military's rewards have been large increases in budget allocations under Abhisit's administration, and few questions about purchasing irregularities.

 

Another irony is that Abhisit and the Democrats have traditionally been the party that most strongly advocated a professional military uninvolved in politics. But the interests of the two have converged in an anti-Thaksin alliance as he continues his involvement in politics while in exile, allegedly funding the current protests. [color:red]The army also appears to need Abhisit to stay in power: Army chief Gen. Anupong Paochinda is slated to retire in October, and anointed successor, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, is known to be unsympathetic to Thaksin. Should Abhisit be forced from office by Red Shirt protests and Thaksin's allies win a new election before October, they could select another general for the top slot who would support Thaksin's return. Such soldiers exist. Thais call them "watermelon soldiers" because they wear green on the outside but are red, the color of Thaksin's followers, on the inside. [/color]

 

Despite this convergence of interests, the army's support for the emergency decree does not appear certain at the moment. A day after the decree was issued the military had yet to take action. Perhaps, once again, the military fears another May 1992 in which by cracking down on protesters it will become the villain. Perhaps new deals are being struck. Or maybe the high command is still preparing its plans for clearing the streets. The next few days may tell. But when Abhisit appeared on national television to announce emergency rule he was flanked by politicians  and noticeably no generals.

 

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978994,00.html#ixzz0kbEa7wtp

 

[Julian2]

It played a key role in Abhisit's rise to the premiership, helping to broker deals between politicians who had been loyal to Thaksin so they would join Abhisit's coalition.

 

That will go down well,I can hear the howls of outrage now about how military coercion played no part in the formation of the current government.