Civil War in The south

[Guest]

Sua Dam: Is your new avatr the reverse end of that luscious little Lolita you had before? (Yes, I KNOW it's not the other end of Chuwit.)

[Evel_Penivel]

Technically, the 54th Massachusetts (of "Glory" fame) and similiar units, such as the U.S. 35th Colored Infantry, weren't integrated, but were "colored" units led by white officers. However, the officers who led these units during the Civil War were all volunteers and most often strong abolitionists. For the day, they had advanced ideas about racial equality, but didn't always favor "race mixing."

[Guest]

Righs, I realized it was hardly an official government policy of full integration. Wondered if a case might be made for it being the first instance of actual integration. Sort of like the Vikings stepping onto Canada, but Columbus discovering America; the times just weren't ripe to exploit the situation.

[Flashermac]

Strong abolitionists? Well, maybe some were ...

 

But the majority of the officers saw it as a chance for higher rank. The colonels had usually been mere lieutenants in a white regiment, while the majors, captains and lieutenants had been sergeants. Volunteering to serve in a "colored" regiment was the easiest way for a white soldier to get a commission.

 

There were several black Union regiments raised in Louisiana after the capture of New Orleans in 1862 which DID have black officers at the beginning. (They were free men, educated and almost invariably mixed race. Some could have passed for white.) But the Union Army did not want its white soldiers having to salute black officers, and the black officers were all soon dismissed or forced to resign.

 

A prof at LSU has written a fine book about the "Louisiana Native Guards", dispelling many false statements about these regiments. Most amazing of all is how difficult it was for the black regiments to get into combat, despite their good fighting record whenever they did. The average black regiment was lucky if it saw just one battle or skirmish. Most were kept on garrison duty to release white regiments to fight. Both sides were quite racist in the American Civil War.

 

p.s. The movie "Glory" sort of left out the white regiments that charged the fort at South Carolina along with the black regiment. Leave it to Hollywood to "improve" on history. Whipping was also banned in the Union Army. One black regiment actually mutinied against its lieutenant colonel after his repeated brutality towards them, including using a bull whip on them. (He was an ex-second lieutenant in a NY regment.) The officer was convicted and dismissed in disgrace. But Hollywood decided to add a whipping scene to "Glory" apparently just for the hell of it.

[Flashermac]

Meanwhile, back on the topic ...

 

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Stratfor: Global Intelligence Brief -

November 3, 2005

 

Thailand: The Headless Southern Insurgency

 

 

Summary

 

Thailand continues to struggle with an ongoing insurgency in the south, characterized by beheadings, bombings and attacks against police and security forces. Though the violence has raised fears of a potential spillover into tourist areas and has caused strains with neighboring Malaysia, the Thai government has yet to find an effective mechanism to deal with the boiling unrest. Bangkok's inability to quell the disturbances in southern Thailand largely stems from the apparent lack of organization behind the unrest, thus leaving little room for negotiations or for finding the insurgency's center of gravity.

 

 

Analysis

 

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has faced a rising challenge in dealing with the boiling unrest in the southern provinces. A steady stream of sectarian attacks, beheadings, bombings and other assorted violence has continued, and efforts by the Thaksin government have accomplished little.

 

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), blamed for fomenting the violence, is attempting negotiations with the government from its headquarters in Europe, but even autonomy talks with the aging militants is unlikely to solve the problem. At its core, the violence in southern Thailand does not represent a coordinated effort by local or international Islamist militants, but a poorly organized -- yet extremely violent -- backlash to central government policies that for years have left the mostly Muslim south far behind the rest of the predominately Buddhist nation.

 

Bangkok's inability to deal effectively with the problems in the

south, then, could relate less to the ineptitude or lack of interest sometimes attributed to the government than to the insurgency's very structure. Recent security reports from the region suggest that though PULO has been blamed for the violence and is certainly trying to exploit the unrest for its own political purposes, the insurgency's core is a loosely coordinated group of local Thai Muslims frustrated with years of central government neglect.

 

In response, the insurgents have fomented a series of violent acts using like-minded individuals and hired thugs to carry out attacks.

 

The insurgency's principals do not seek unification with Malaysia, as some fear, nor do they even have ethnic-Malay roots. They firmly consider themselves Thai, but have determined that the only way to change Thai government policies is through violent action. Their actions are largely limited to the southern provinces, with little evidence of any intent to move them further north to the tourist or business areas of Thailand.

 

The loose organizational nature of the insurgents, however, makes the insurgency extremely hard to tackle. There is no central leader; no individual or group able to negotiate an end to the violence. Other groups and individuals, from Buddhists and Muslims to organized crime and illegal-timber and drug traffickers, already have taken advantage of the unrest. Unconfirmed reports also maintain that elements of the

military and police have engaged in some of the attacks as part of the illegal timber trade.

 

This situation of several separate interest groups carrying out their own agendas, either directly or under the cover of others, means the violence in southern Thailand represents a nearly insoluble problem the central government. In fact, the violence has in places taken on a life of its own; no longer coordinated, it has become a movement in and of itself. And while few signs exist of links to internationalist Islamist movements such as al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah, the continuation of unrest could create an opening for these broader movements to exploit -- either through the provision of sanctuary or as a location for training and recruiting.